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Overview

The Formbricks MCP server exposes v3 Surveys and Workflows tool surfaces for AI agents. It runs inside the Formbricks web app at /api/mcp and reuses the same v3 API authentication, authorization, rate limiting, response handling, and audit logging paths as the REST routes.
OAuth 2.1 is the preferred authentication path for MCP clients. Formbricks API keys remain supported as a backwards-compatible fallback for local development, self-hosters, and clients that do not support MCP OAuth yet.
Looking for step-by-step setup guides for Claude Code, the Claude apps, and Codex? See Connect AI agents (MCP). This handbook covers the technical internals.

Endpoint

Use the streamable HTTP MCP endpoint on the Formbricks app:
For local development:
The route supports POST requests, runs with the Next.js Node.js runtime, and sets private no-store response headers. Browser-origin MCP requests must come from the configured Formbricks app origin.

Protocol revisions

The server implements protocol revision 2026-07-28 and keeps serving the 2025 era from the same endpoint, so a client on an older revision does not need to change anything. The MCP TypeScript SDK answers the legacy initialize handshake alongside server/discover, and mcp-handler serves with legacy: "stateless". Three parts of the revision are handled by the SDK rather than by our code: the server/discover RPC, the resultType field now required on every result, and the ttlMs / cacheScope cache hints (which default conservatively to ttlMs: 0 and cacheScope: "private"). Notable removals in the revision that used to be configured here: protocol-level sessions and the Mcp-Session-Id header, the initialize handshake as a precondition, and the HTTP+SSE transport. The handler therefore takes no sessionIdGenerator, disableSse, basePath, or maxDuration option — the route this handler is mounted on is the only mount point. OAuth clients discover the protected resource metadata here:
The metadata advertises /api/mcp as the protected resource and points clients to the Better Auth issuer under /api/auth.

Authentication

OAuth 2.1

OAuth clients use Authorization Code + PKCE with Dynamic Client Registration. Registration is open (no initial access token — MCP clients self-register), so it accepts only redirect URIs an attacker can never receive an authorization code at:
  • http loopback — localhost, 127.0.0.1 or [::1] on any port — which local clients (Claude Code, Codex, MCP Inspector) use.
  • An exact hosted-connector callback: https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback, https://claude.com/api/mcp/auth_callback and https://chatgpt.com/connector_platform_oauth_redirect (HOSTED_MCP_CLIENT_REDIRECT_URIS in apps/web/modules/auth/lib/mcp-dcr-redirect-policy.ts), plus any a self-hoster adds with MCP_DCR_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS. These match by exact string, so a code can only ever reach the vendor.
Any other redirect URI is refused with 400 invalid_redirect_uri before Better Auth sees the request. post_logout_redirect_uris stays loopback-only. The MCP protected resource is:
The authorization server issuer is:
Discovery endpoints: Supported scopes: The rule: every MCP tool is registered through registerScopedTool, which takes the required scope(s) as a mandatory argument and runs the gate before the handler. Read tools declare <resource>:read; every mutating tool declares <resource>:write. A tool cannot be registered without declaring a scope, so a new tool inherits enforcement by construction — the gate returns a 403 insufficient_scope before the handler touches a v3 operation. Tools that more than one scope group legitimately reaches pass { anyOf: [...] } instead of a plain list, which keeps them on the same registration path rather than a hand-rolled gate. There are no exceptions, and tests are what keep it that way. The feedback-record tools were one for a while — they gated inside their own handler factories and registered through server.registerTool directly, which meant every handler was checked but a new tool added outside those factories would have registered unguarded. ENG-2119 moved all ten onto registerScopedTool and made guardMcpScopes / guardMcpAnyScope private again, so the guards are no longer reachable from a tool module. Be precise about what that guarantees. Privacy removes the hand-rolled gate, and the compiler stops you forgetting registerScopedTool’s scope argument — but it cannot stop a module calling server.registerTool(...) directly, because server is an argument to every tool module. No type system reaches that. The checks that do: a test pins registerScopedTool as the only export of guard-scopes.ts, and feedback-records.test.ts drives all ten tools with the opposite scope, which goes red if a tool is registered unguarded or wired to the wrong scope. A new scope is advertised only together with a migration that grants it to existing clients. MCP_RESOURCE_SCOPES is what the protected-resource metadata and the 401 challenge publish, and a spec-following client (the MCP SDK takes its scope from exactly those) asks for everything in it. The provider validates that request against the scopes the client registered with, so advertising a scope to clients that registered before it existed earns them invalid_scope. responses:read / responses:write show the full sequence: added to MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES and to the resource’s allowedScopes (ENG-2862), then to each registered client’s scopes by a data migration that mirrors what the client already holds and skips skipConsent clients, and only then to MCP_RESOURCE_SCOPES (ENG-3470). Skip the client migration and every integration registered before the scope existed breaks at its next sign-in. There is no single mandatory baseline scope. Authentication requires at least one resource scope (MCP_RESOURCE_SCOPES), so a workflows-only or feedbackRecords:read-only grant is a legitimate MCP client. list_workspaces — the workspaceId-discovery prerequisite for every resource tool — therefore gates on any resource read scope rather than one specific one; its result is derived from the caller’s own memberships and key grants, so admitting any read scope exposes nothing extra. The authorization server supports all of the above, but the MCP protected-resource metadata (/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp) advertises only the resource scopes an MCP client needs — surveys:read, surveys:write, workflows:read, workflows:write, feedbackRecords:read, feedbackRecords:write, responses:read, responses:write, and offline_access. Clients derive their Dynamic Client Registration scopes from that list, so offline_access must be advertised there for clients to be issued refresh tokens (openid/profile/email are OIDC scopes the MCP resource does not require).
Never advertise a new resource scope without a data migration that grants it to existing oauthClient rows. The authorization server validates /authorize against the scopes the client registered with, so a client registered before the change requests the newly advertised scope and is rejected with invalid_scope. It does not fall back to the scopes it already holds, and re-consenting does not help, because the same client_id is reused. Ship the migration in the same release as the list change, as responses:* did (see A new scope family), and nothing breaks: users see one consent screen naming the new scopes. If a client is already stuck on invalid_scope, it recovers by registering again: remove and re-add the MCP server (for example claude mcp remove <name>, then claude mcp add …).
OAuth scopes gate MCP tool categories at the token layer. Actual workspace access is still evaluated at tool execution through the existing v3 authorization checks for the signed-in Formbricks user, so a token scope and a workspace role are independent gates — a call must satisfy both. Scope groups are independent: a token authenticates as long as it holds at least one resource scope, so a feedbackRecords:read-only grant is valid and simply can’t reach the survey tools. list_workspaces is the shared discovery tool and accepts either read scope.

API-key fallback

API-key MCP access remains supported. Authenticate with a Formbricks API key in a request header:
or:
Do not pass credentials in the query string. The MCP route rejects query credential names such as api_key, x-api-key, access_token, token, and authorization case-insensitively. API key permissions are enforced through the same workspace access checks as the v3 REST API: Synthesized MCP scopes for an API key: surveys:read + workflows:read + feedbackRecords:read always; the matching :write scopes when the key has write or manage on any workspace. The scope gate and the per-workspace access check above are independent — a :write tool requires both the :write scope on the token and write/manage on the target workspace.
Store fallback MCP API keys as environment variables or client secrets. Do not commit API keys into MCP client config files.

Local Setup

Start Formbricks and prepare the database:
Restart the dev server after changing tool registrations. The MCP server is built once at module scope by createMcpHandler, so hot reload does not pick up an added, removed or renamed tool — tools/list keeps serving the previous set until the process restarts.
Verify OAuth discovery:
OAuth-capable MCP clients should dynamically register a public client and request resource equal to the MCP URL:
Manual Dynamic Client Registration smoke test:
This passes scope explicitly, so it does not reproduce a real client’s behavior — real MCP clients register with the scopes from the protected-resource metadata’s scopes_supported (surveys:read surveys:write workflows:read workflows:write feedbackRecords:read feedbackRecords:write offline_access). Because the authorization server validates the /authorize request against the client’s registered scopes, a client that registers with a narrower set than it later requests (e.g. it registers surveys-only but requests offline_access) is rejected with invalid_scope. To smoke-test the real path, omit scope and let the client adopt the advertised set, or pass exactly what the metadata advertises.
For the same reason, the scope in the MCP endpoint’s 401 WWW-Authenticate challenge is exactly the metadata’s scopes_supported, not a subset — a client that hits the 401 before fetching the metadata uses the challenge string as its registration scope. The two are derived from one constant (MCP_CHALLENGE_SCOPE) and a test asserts they stay equal; when they diverged, every new client failed its first connect with invalid_scope and only succeeded on retry.
The consent screen is served at /account/authorize. Users can revoke approved MCP clients from /account/settings/authorized-apps. For API-key fallback, create an API key in the Formbricks app with access to the target workspace. Use the least privileged permission needed by the agent workflow. Verify that the MCP endpoint can list tools:

Codex Configuration

OAuth

Add the HTTP MCP server. Include --oauth-resource so the OAuth access token is audience-bound to the MCP resource URL:
Authenticate and request the scopes the agent needs:
For read-only usage, omit the :write scopes:
Scope groups are independent — a token needs at least one resource scope, but not all of them. To use only the feedback-record tools, request feedbackRecords:read (plus feedbackRecords:write to create) and omit the survey scopes. Codex opens the browser to Formbricks, completes Dynamic Client Registration, and stores the OAuth client and tokens in Codex’s credential store. The user approves the requested scopes on the Formbricks consent screen. Equivalent Codex config for the server entry:
Verify the registration:
Then ask Codex to use the configured server:

API-key fallback

Store the API key in the shell environment:
For Codex Desktop on macOS, persist the value in the launch environment and restart Codex Desktop:
Register the local MCP server with a bearer-token environment variable:

Claude Configuration

Claude Code

OAuth

Add the remote HTTP MCP server:
Run /mcp and authenticate formbricks-local. Claude Code discovers the MCP protected-resource metadata, registers a public client whose scopes are taken from that metadata’s scopes_supported (surveys:read surveys:write workflows:read workflows:write feedbackRecords:read feedbackRecords:write offline_access), and launches the browser-based OAuth flow — there is no scope-entry step. You approve the requested scopes on the Formbricks consent screen. A :write tool requires both the matching :write scope on the token and write/manage permission on the target workspace at execution time (see Authentication). Verify it:
For project-shared Claude Code configuration, use .mcp.json without static credentials:
If the installed Claude Code version does not start the OAuth flow for remote HTTP servers, use the API-key fallback below until that client is updated.

API-key fallback

Set the API key:
Add the HTTP MCP server:
For a project-shared fallback configuration, keep the API key outside git:
Claude Code will fail to parse this fallback config if FORMBRICKS_MCP_API_KEY is not set.

Claude Desktop

If the installed Claude Desktop build supports remote HTTP MCP server entries, add the same server definition to the Claude Desktop config file and restart Claude Desktop. Prefer the OAuth entry without headers when supported; use the API-key header entry only as a fallback. macOS config path:
Example config:
Fallback config with an API key:
Set the API key in the Desktop launch environment before opening Claude Desktop when using the fallback config:
If a Claude Desktop version only supports stdio MCP servers, use Claude Code for the HTTP endpoint or add a local stdio-to-HTTP bridge.

Tool Responses

Tool results include both structuredContent and a text content item containing the same JSON string. Successful results mirror the v3 REST response body and add requestId for correlation. Errors are returned as MCP error tool results with a structured v3 problem payload:

Declared result shapes

The response tools advertise an outputSchema, which no other tool does yet. A client can read the result shape off tools/list rather than inferring it from an example, and the SDK checks the structured result against the same schema it advertised. One object root with every branch optional, built by mcpToolOutput: a tool answers either the success payload or the error one, which reads like a union — but a union converts to a root-level anyOf, and the SDK then wraps the result for a 2025-era client to keep the wire shape legal. An object root is identity on both eras, so the same structured payload reaches every client. The cost is that the schema cannot say “exactly one of these”, which is why the error branch is described in full: a client can still tell the two apart by which key is present.

Tool Arguments

Every tool input schema is strict: an argument a tool does not declare is rejected, not ignored. The advertised JSON Schema carries additionalProperties: false, and the SDK validates the call before the handler runs, so an undeclared or misspelled key comes back as an input-validation error result and the underlying v3 operation is never reached. This matters most on filters. A dropped filter does not narrow, so the pre-strict behaviour ran the query wider than asked and reported success — count_feedback_records with a misspelled userId (the correct key is user_id) returned the count for every record in the dataset, which an agent has no way to tell from a real answer. Strictness applies at every depth, not just to the outermost object: a misspelled key inside filter.status is rejected the same way a misspelled top-level argument is. This matters because a dropped nested filter key does not merely lose the key — it leaves the filter object empty, so the query runs wider than asked. Two kinds of exception:
  • Free-form by design. blocks, metadata, welcomeCard and friends on create_survey, and the data payload on patch_survey / validate_survey, accept any nested shape. They are validated by the v3 survey document contract once the call reaches the operation.
  • The workflow definition. Everything below definition on create_workflow and patch_workflow is still open, so a misspelled key inside a trigger, node, edge or node config is dropped rather than rejected. That schema is shared with the v3 Workflows REST API and the workflow builder, so tightening it is a v3 API change rather than an MCP one; it is tracked as ENG-2437. Treat a create_workflow result as confirming only what it echoes back.
A client that adds its own keys to a tool call’s arguments will be rejected. Nothing in the MCP spec invites that, but it is a behaviour change from earlier Formbricks releases, which silently dropped such keys.Two consequences worth knowing. Read-modify-write needs trimming: update_feedback_record accepts only the eight mutable fields, so echoing a record straight back from get_feedback_record is rejected — strip the provenance (source_*, field_*, submission_id, collected_at) and the derived sentiment/emotions/translation first. The error names every key to remove. And list_workspaces takes no arguments at all, so a client that pads zero-argument calls with a placeholder key will fail on the one tool every other workspace-scoped tool depends on for its workspaceId.
Array arguments are bounded. No array in a tool call may hold more than 1 000 items, and all the arrays in one call together at most 50 000 elements, at any depth; and a call may nest at most 256 levels of objects and arrays. A call over any of these is refused with a JSON-RPC -32602 error before its arguments are parsed. Fields with a tighter bound advertise it as maxItems in the tool’s input schema — create_survey’s blocks, endings, variables and languages, get_survey’s lang, the list filters’ in arrays, and create_feedback_records’ records. A request body may be at most 2 MB, whether or not it declares a Content-Length.

Adding a tool

A tool is a thin adapter over a v3 operation: it parses its input, calls the operation with the caller’s authentication, and relays the result. It never queries the database or checks tenancy itself — the operation owns both — so the MCP surface follows the v3 API rather than growing semantics of its own.
1

Start from the operation

Find or add the operation in apps/web/app/api/v3/<resource>/lib/operations.ts, with its REST route and OpenAPI entry. Operations return a Response for every outcome, errors included, and never throw: MCP calls them without the route wrapper. Two families differ: workflow tools call the @formbricks/workflows handlers through app/api/v3/workflows/lib/context.ts, and feedback-record tools call operations over the Hub service while the REST route proxies straight to the Hub, so they have no one-to-one REST twin.
2

Declare the input

In tools/schemas.ts (or tools/<resource>-schemas.ts). Use .strict() on the object and z.strictObject on nested ones, lengthBoundedArray for arrays, .describe() on every field, and .extend() the v3 body schema rather than restating it. schemas.test.ts fails on any structured object that is not strict, but only in the modules it spreads into allExports — add a new schema module there. Never take a tenant id from input.
3

Declare the output

outputSchema: mcpToolOutput(<v3 resource schema>), built from the v3 resource schema and never retyped. The SDK validates every successful result against it (error results are skipped), so a schema that drifts fails every call that would otherwise have succeeded.
4

Register it

In tools/<resource>.ts, through registerScopedTool — the only registration path, which runs the scope gate before the handler. Reads call the operation directly:
A mutation differs in two places, and both are needed: audit: { action, targetType, targetIdArg? } in the config (records a call the scope gate refused) and runMcpMutation(ctx, { action, resource }, ({ authentication, requestId, auditLog }) => operation(...)) in the handler (records the outcome). Gate writes on <resource>:write. A dry run is read only if it is a pure function of its input (validate_survey); one that resolves references is write (validate_response).
5

Test it

Next to the tool, in tools/<resource>.test.ts: drive the handler with the opposite scope and assert the 403 detail, and assert the roster of registered names (see responses.test.ts and feedback-records.test.ts). Run pnpm test; restart the dev server to see the tool in tools/list.
6

Document it

Add its section under Available Tools, a row in the scope, permission and REST-mapping tables on this page, and in the scope table of platform/mcp/overview.mdx if it adds a tool to a scope.

A new scope family

Reusing <resource>:read / <resource>:write needs nothing more. A new resource family also needs:
  1. The scope pair in MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES (modules/auth/lib/oauth-urls.ts), and a data migration that appends it to existing oauthResource.allowedScopes rows — mcp-oauth-resource-seed.test.ts fails until the migration is listed in its REPAIR_MIGRATIONS. Without it, on every instance that already upgraded, a client asking only for the new scope gets invalid_scope, and one asking for it alongside others is silently granted less than it asked for. Neither logs.
  2. API-key scopes in getMcpScopes (modules/mcp/auth.ts), the consent label in getOAuthScopeLabel plus its en-US string (then pnpm i18n), and the anyOf list on list_workspaces.
  3. registerXTools(server) in modules/mcp/server.ts, before the final instrumentMcpServerWithTracing.
  4. Last, MCP_RESOURCE_SCOPES, which advertises the scope, in the same release as a data migration that appends the pair to existing oauthClient.scopes rows. Mirror read/write (:read only for clients that hold a read scope) and skip skipConsent clients, as 20261005130000_eng_3470_grant_responses_scopes_to_clients does. Without it, every client registered before the scope existed requests it and gets invalid_scope at its next sign-in (see Authentication).

What makes a tool good

  • One tool per operation. An MCP-only convenience tool is a second surface to document, test and keep in step. When an operation’s shape costs the agent real tokens or errors, add a better v3 operation instead — edit_survey_blocks is one (PATCH /api/v3/surveys/{surveyId}/blocks), addressing blocks by id rather than resending the whole array.
  • Descriptions are paid for on every session. tools/list ships every description and every field .describe() to the model each time. State what the tool does, its side effects, and when to prefer another tool. Spend a long description only where the wrong pick is likely and silent (list_responses against feedback records); everywhere else use the one-line form.
  • Small pages, cheap counts. Cap limit below the REST maximum (default 20, max 50–100 against 250), keep expensive totals opt-in, use opaque cursors, and give list-shaped resources a count_* tool so “how many” never means paging.
  • Concise by default. Return the handle for the next call, not the whole resource: response_format: "concise" returns id and updatedAt, which is the next call’s expectedUpdatedAt. The projection is MCP-only; REST keeps the full resource.
  • Errors that say what to do next. Relay the v3 problem document unchanged: invalid_params names the field, a 409 carries currentUpdatedAt. Reject unknown keys instead of dropping them.
  • Honest annotations. destructiveHint: true whenever the previous value is unrecoverable from the result, including whole-subtree replaces. For an irreversible delete, consider confirming first the way delete_response does (elicitation, with a confirm argument for clients that cannot answer prompts).

Available Tools

list_surveys

Lists surveys in one workspace. The tool is read-only and idempotent. Input:
Output:
totalCount is the number of surveys matching the filters; workspaceSurveyCount is every survey in the workspace, archived ones included and independent of the filters, so it can be larger. Both are null when includeTotalCount is false.

get_survey

Gets one survey by ID. The tool is read-only and idempotent. Input:
lang is optional. When supplied, it filters translatable survey fields to the requested language codes or configured aliases.

create_survey

Creates a block-based link survey using the v3 survey document contract. The tool writes data and is not idempotent. A block is { name, elements[], id? }; an element is { id, type, headline, ... }. The element type is one of fileUpload, openText, multipleChoiceSingle, multipleChoiceMulti, nps, cta, rating, consent, pictureSelection, cal, date, matrix, address, ranking, contactInfo, csat, ces. Element ids are caller-supplied and become immutable once the survey leaves draft; block ids are generated when omitted. Translatable fields are keyed by locale code and must carry every configured language — the internal default key is rejected. The same list is carried on the tool’s own blocks description, generated from TSurveyElementTypeEnum so the two cannot drift. Per-type required fields are not restated here. validate_survey will reject an element that is missing them, but it reports the element by its position rather than naming the field: the element schema is an undiscriminated union, so a wrong or absent type makes every branch fail and the message is a generic Invalid input. Send the type’s own fields with the element rather than expecting the validator to name them. Input:
Output uses the same survey resource shape as GET /api/v3/surveys/{surveyId} and includes the MCP requestId.

validate_survey

Validates a create or patch payload without writing survey changes. The tool is read-only and idempotent; workspace access is still checked when workspaceId is present, at read level — matching the surveys:read scope the tool declares. Create validation input:
Patch validation input:
Validation failures return 200 with valid: false and structured invalid_params, matching POST /api/v3/surveys/validate. Custom CSS validation input — processes CSS alone, for a preview, without saving anything:
scope is workspace or survey; surveyId is optional, survey scope only, and must belong to workspaceId. A valid result carries the compiled customCss and warnings (removed constructs, each with a stable code, appearance, line, column and reason); an invalid one carries errors and no compiled output. A create or patch payload that includes customCss is processed the same way, additively.

patch_survey

Updates a survey by ID using the v3 survey patch contract. The tool writes data, can be destructive, and is not idempotent. Omitted top-level fields are preserved. Provided top-level objects and arrays replace that whole subtree, so omitted nested entries inside a provided subtree can be removed. The patch tool does not deep-merge nested objects and does not implement JSON Patch. For a change confined to one or a few blocks, prefer edit_survey_blocks, which does not require resending the others. The full get_survey output may be sent straight back: server-owned fields (id, workspaceId, type, createdAt, archivedAt, defaultLanguage, languages[].alias) are accepted and verified, and changing one is a 422 read_only_field rather than a silent ignore. A round-tripped updatedAt acts as an optimistic-concurrency precondition, so the patch is rejected with 409 if the survey changed since your read.
For agent workflows, fetch the current survey first, modify only the intended top-level fields, run validate_survey with operation: "patch", and then submit the same patch with patch_survey. If the change is confined to blocks, stop here and use edit_survey_blocks or set_survey_block_order instead — they are cheaper and cannot drop a block by omission.
Input:
Output uses the same survey resource shape as GET /api/v3/surveys/{surveyId} and includes the MCP requestId. customCss on create_survey and patch_survey is source only — { "light": "…", "dark": "…" }, both keys, each a string or null; null clears it, and on a patch an omitted customCss is kept. Compiled output is computed by the server, and a payload carrying compiled or processorVersion is rejected. A successful write that processed CSS returns the removed constructs as a top-level warnings array beside data; adding or editing CSS on a Cloud organization without the Scale plan is a 403 custom_css_plan_required, clearing it never is. get_survey returns the source in customCss.

get_workspace_custom_css

Reads a workspace’s shared survey CSS: customCss and previous (the one recoverable revision) as source, status (ok, stale — recompiled from source because the processor changed — or withheld, when that source no longer passes and respondents get none of it), and canEdit / planAllowed for the caller. Read-only and idempotent; surveys:read plus read access to the workspace. Input:

patch_workspace_custom_css

Saves or clears the workspace’s shared survey CSS. customCss replaces both fields; null clears all of it, and unchanged source writes nothing. Removed constructs come back as top-level warnings; CSS the processor rejects is a 422 with details.errors, and the saved CSS stays in effect. The replaced value becomes previous, restored by sending its source back. The scope is surveys:write because this is shared survey CSS, but the scope is only the first gate: the operation still requires an organization owner or manager (OAuth or session user) or an API key with manage on the workspace — a write grant is refused — and, on Cloud, the Scale plan to add or edit. Both refusals, like a scope refusal, are audited. Input:
Both tools declare an outputSchema: the workspace custom CSS resource under data, plus warnings on a write.

edit_survey_blocks

Edits a survey’s blocks in place — update, insert or remove whole blocks without resending the ones you are not changing. The tool writes data, can be destructive, and is not idempotent. Operations apply in order against a single snapshot and land atomically: either all of them do or none do. Blocks are addressed by id, never by position, so a concurrent edit cannot redirect an operation onto a different block. An update replaces the target block entirely, and the replacement must carry every language the survey has configured. An insert anchors at start, end, or after a block id — including one an earlier operation in the same request inserted. block.id is optional on both: an insert without one gets a server-generated id, returned in the concise response’s applied list, and an update takes it from the operation’s id. Removing a block orphans any answers already collected for its elements, and the API cannot undo that. The editor shows a human a caution before this; an agent has no equivalent, so confirm with the user before removing a block from a survey that is not a draft.
Fetch the survey first and pass its updatedAt as expectedUpdatedAt. If the survey changed since your read the call returns 409 with both timestamps in details — re-read and retry. The concise response carries the new updatedAt, so a run of edits chains without fetching again.
Input:
Output defaults to a concise acknowledgement — id, updatedAt, blockCount and the operations applied — plus the MCP requestId. The full survey resource is ~15k tokens on a large survey, which would refill an agent’s context as fast as resending the blocks did, so it is opt-in via response_format: "detailed". REST always returns the full resource.

set_survey_block_order

Replaces the order of a survey’s blocks by listing every current block id exactly once. Block content is untouched. The tool writes data and can be destructive, but unlike every other survey write it is idempotent: the same order yields the same survey, and an order that already matches performs no write at all, so updatedAt does not move and other callers’ preconditions stay valid. A stale expectedUpdatedAt still returns 409 on that path: the precondition is evaluated before the method, so a no-op outcome never reports success to a caller whose view is out of date. Because the list must be a permutation, a dropped or duplicated block is rejected rather than silently applied — the failure that resending the whole blocks array cannot catch. Input:
Output matches edit_survey_blocks: concise by default, echoing the applied order.

delete_survey

Deletes one survey by ID. The tool is destructive, writes data, and is not idempotent. Input:
The v3 REST delete operation returns 204 No Content. The MCP tool result contains the requestId so callers can correlate the audit trail:

Workflow tools

Workflow tools operate on the v3 Workflows API (trigger → condition → action automations). They reuse the same authentication, authorization, audit logging, and error mapping as the survey tools.

list_workflows

Lists workflows in one workspace. Read-only and idempotent. Input:
Output mirrors the v3 list envelope: { "data": [...], "meta": { "limit", "nextCursor" }, "requestId" }. Omitting filter.status.in returns every status except archived.

get_workflow

Gets one workflow by ID. Read-only and idempotent. Unknown or cross-workspace ids return 403 (never 404) so existence is not leaked.

list_workflow_runs

Lists workflow runs for a workspace, newest first. Read-only and idempotent.
Only workspaceId is required. Omit filter.isDryRun to return both real and dry runs.

get_workflow_run

Gets one workflow run with its ordered step logs. Read-only and idempotent.

test_workflow

Dry-runs a workflow: validates its live definition would execute and resolves the trigger’s survey + ending cards. No run is persisted and no side effects occur; the result reports { ok, problems }. Annotated read-only (no world mutation). Drafts are testable — checking the setup before going live is the point of a dry run — so a workflow can be tested straight after create_workflow. Only archived workflows are rejected, with 422 invalid_workflow_state, since they are soft-deleted.

create_workflow

Creates a workflow, always as a draft (only enable_workflow makes it live). Writes data; not idempotent. Takes the full v3 create payload:

patch_workflow

Updates a workflow (v3 PATCH contract: top-level partial merge, no deep merge). Destructive; not idempotent. definition edits are only accepted while the workflow is draft or disabled.

duplicate_workflow

Duplicates a workflow as a new draft with empty run and version history. Writes data; not idempotent.
name is optional; if omitted the server picks a non-conflicting copy name.

Lifecycle tools

delete_workflow, enable_workflow, disable_workflow, archive_workflow, and unarchive_workflow each take only a workflow id:
  • enable_workflow — validates executability, snapshots an immutable version, and makes the workflow live. A non-executable definition is refused with 422 workflow_not_executable.
    Once live, the workflow runs on matching survey responses and can send emails.
  • disable_workflow — stops future runs.
  • archive_workflow / unarchive_workflow — soft archive and restore (to draft).
  • delete_workflow — the v3 delete returns 204 No Content; the MCP result contains the requestId.

Response tools

Eight tools, one per documented v3 response operation. The set mirrors the API deliberately: what an agent can do through MCP is what an API key can do over HTTP, read off one list rather than two. Every tool description states the boundary against the feedback-record tools, because list_feedback_records(source_id=<surveyId>) looks like it answers the same question and does not — see Feedback Records And The Hub below. The full paragraph goes on list_responses and count_responses, where the wrong pick is both likely and quiet; the others carry a one-line form, since a description is context every client pays for on every tools/list.

list_responses / count_responses / get_response

Read-only and idempotent. workspaceId is always required; surveyId or contactId narrows it, and the finished and language filters require one of those two anchors because without one they are unbounded scans. list_responses caps limit at 50 — below the API’s 250, because an agent’s binding constraint is its context window and a response carries every answer.

validate_response

A dry run of a create or patch: reports valid, invalid_params, and — when valid — the effects a write would have, including the language that would be stamped and the quotas that would count. It declares responses:write although it writes nothing, because it resolves the same references the write resolves; gating it at read would make it a cheaper existence probe than the operation it describes.

create_response / update_response

create_response records a real submission: webhooks, integrations, follow-ups, quotas and metering all run. update_response replaces data and tags wholesale rather than merging, which is why it is annotated destructiveHint: true — to add one tag, read the response and send every tag it should end up with. Both take the v3 body as an opaque data argument and let the operation parse it, so the tool and the route answer the same thing to a malformed body.

delete_response / batch_delete_responses

Both ask before they delete, over the multi-round-trip input_required flow: the first call returns an elicitation/create request and an opaque requestState, and the client retries with the answer. The pending confirmation is HMAC-sealed by createRequestStateCodec and bound to the caller, and the handler compares the sealed resourceId against the arguments on re-entry. Both come back through the client, so without that comparison a client could be asked about response A and retry the confirmation against response B. The batch tool binds the exact id list, so a confirmation for two ids does not carry over to a third. confirm: true skips the prompt. That is not a convenience bolted on afterwards — it is the path a 2025-era client and a headless caller use, and without it those clients could not delete at all.
Both are idempotentHint: true: a response that is already gone answers the same 403 as one that was never this caller’s, so repeating the call converges rather than compounding.

list_feedback_datasets

Lists the active feedback datasets assigned to a workspace. Read-only and idempotent. Use the returned id as datasetId for the other feedback-record tools. Input:
Output:

list_feedback_records

Lists feedback records in a workspace’s feedback dataset. Read-only and idempotent, with opaque cursor pagination. datasetId is optional when the workspace has exactly one active dataset (the common case) and required when it has more than one. Input:
All filters are optional. They mirror the Hub’s own GET /v1/feedback-records parameters, and each is named after the record field it filters — so filtering by a user_id you just read in a response is spelled the same way. An unknown filter key is rejected with a 422 rather than ignored, since a silently dropped filter would widen the result set without saying so. How they combine. Every identity filter accepts one value or a list of them. Repeating one filter ORs its values; different filters are ANDed. So source_type: ["survey", "review"] with sentiment: ["negative"] reads as “(survey OR review) AND negative”. There is no way to OR across different filters. Value limits mirror the Hub’s: at most 100 values per filter (the enum filters cap at their own label count instead), 255 characters per value, and 10 for a language tag. Crossing either bound is a 422 naming the filter, never a silent truncation to the first 100. An empty string is not the same thing here as on the Hub directly: the Hub treats ?source_type= as identical to omitting the filter, but every string filter on this surface requires at least one character, so an empty value is rejected rather than ignored.
Every range filter excludes records whose column is empty. value_number_min: 0 is not “everything” — it drops every text answer, because they carry no number. Likewise sentiment_score_min: -1 means “every enriched record”, not every record. To find the records enrichment has not reached, use has_sentiment: false rather than a score range.
A backwards range is rejected, not run as an empty query. value_number_min: 5, value_number_max: 1 is a 400 naming both bounds (e.g. value_number_min — “must be less than or equal to value_number_max”). This applies to every range pair, including the timestamp ones; it is the Hub’s own check relayed as-is, not something validated here, so the message always names the Hub’s parameters.
Ordering. sort accepts collected_at (the default), created_at or updated_at, and order accepts asc or desc (default desc). updated_at is ascending-only: pass order: asc explicitly, since the Hub answers 400 to desc and to an omitted order. Neither applies to count_feedback_records, which rejects them. A cursor marks a position within one specific ordering, so keep sort and order identical for the whole traversal — presenting a cursor under a different ordering is rejected rather than silently returning a page that looks like a continuation. collected_at and created_at diverge whenever historical data is imported: the feedback was collected months ago but stored today. Use created_since for “what did this import bring in”, and since for “what did people tell us in this period”. updated_at is the third timestamp: it is stamped on create, on every correction and on every translation, sentiment and emotion result (not on embeddings or topic assignment), so updated_since answers “what was created or changed since” — incremental extraction. Pair it with sort: updated_at, order: asc: each page is one index range, and a record that changes mid-traversal normally moves ahead of the cursor (returned again). A write that started before the cursor’s position and commits after it still lands behind; the run-start watermark picks it up next run. The next run’s updated_since is when the previous run started, minus an overlap — not the newest updated_at received, which skips a write that was still committing when the traversal read past its timestamp. It never returns a deleted record, since a delete leaves nothing to match; the full procedure, deletions included, is in the v3 API introduction. The workspace/dataset/pagination parameters (workspaceId, datasetId, limit, cursor) stay camelCase: they name nothing in the record. Output mirrors the Hub feedback-record shape and paginates with meta.nextCursor. meta also names the dataset that was searched, so an empty data array unambiguously means that dataset holds no matching records — a caller that let the dataset auto-resolve does not need a second call to find out which one it was:

count_feedback_records

Counts the feedback records matching a filter set, without fetching them — for “how many” questions that would otherwise mean paging through records. Read-only and idempotent. Takes the same filters as list_feedback_records (no limit/cursor, and no sort/order — the Hub’s count endpoint does not accept ordering and they are rejected here), because the Hub documents its count endpoint as accepting the same query parameters as its list endpoint; both go through one mapper in lib/operations.ts, so a count always describes the same set as the equivalent list. Input:
Output is the total and the dataset it came from — no record content, which is the point: a caller asking “how many” never pulls end-user text into its context to find out.

get_feedback_record

Gets one feedback record by its Hub UUID. Read-only and idempotent. The record must belong to a feedback dataset assigned to the workspace; otherwise the tool returns a generic authorization error and never reveals whether a record id exists in another tenant. Input:

create_feedback_record

Creates a feedback record in a workspace’s feedback dataset. Writes data and is not idempotent, and requires feedbackRecords:write (API keys need write or manage). The tenant is derived from the resolved feedback dataset and is never taken from the request body. submission_id is optional — a UUID is generated when omitted. Input:
Output is the created feedback record (Hub shape) plus the MCP requestId.

create_feedback_records

Creates several feedback records in one call — the batch form of create_feedback_record, for imports. Writes data, is not idempotent, and requires feedbackRecords:write. Between 1 and 50 records per call. The Hub has no bulk-create endpoint (its only bulk write is the delete-by-user erasure path), so this fans out to one Hub create per record, in parallel. Two consequences are deliberate:
  • Validation is all-or-nothing. Every record is validated before any is written, so a malformed batch is rejected without leaving half of it stored. invalid_params names the offending index, e.g. records.3.value_text.
  • Partial success is reported, not hidden. If the Hub rejects some records — a duplicate (submission_id, field_id), say — the created ones are returned and meta.failures accounts for the rest by index, so only those need retrying. If nothing could be created, the upstream failure is returned as the response instead, because an empty success would read as “there was nothing to do”.
The 50-record cap is an amplification bound as much as a payload one: one authorized request must not become an unbounded burst of upstream writes.
A batch is not a submission. Each record without a submission_id gets its own generated one, exactly as in the single-record case — so several answers that belong to the same submission (a survey response, or a call with both a rating and a comment) must carry the same submission_id, set by the caller. Omit it and they are stored as unrelated submissions, which nothing downstream can distinguish from the intended shape.
Input:
Output:
Per-record failure text goes through the same relay rules as a whole-request failure: a Hub 4xx explains itself, anything else becomes a fixed message. Each record actually created produces its own created audit event — N creations are N events, not one summary.

update_feedback_record

Corrects the value of an existing feedback record. Writes data, is annotated destructiveHint: true (it overwrites a stored value; the previous one survives only in the audit log), and requires feedbackRecords:write (API keys need write or manage). Only the fields sent are changed; at least one is required. For API keys, the same dataset-exclusivity rule applies as for deletes: the key may update only a record in a dataset assigned to exactly one workspace, where its permission unambiguously covers every record present (ENG-2189). A shared dataset returns 403; an integration needing to update records in both workspaces should use a workspace-scoped key per workspace. Session, OAuth and MCP-person principals are unaffected and authorize through their organization role instead. Updatable — the Hub’s own mutable set: value_text, value_number, value_boolean, value_date, value_id, user_id, language, metadata. The schema is .pick()ed from the create fields, so bounds can’t drift between creating and correcting a record. The value_* field being set must be one the record’s field_type accepts — the same table create enforces (text takes value_text, nps/rating/number take value_number, categorical takes value_text and/or value_id, and so on). Because field_type is immutable it is not part of the patch, so this is checked against the stored record and therefore reported after the ownership check, as a 422 naming the offending field. Without it a patch could assemble what create rejects: putting value_number on a text record would leave both a text and a number set, with nothing to say which one the record means. The Hub does not enforce this itself. Not updatable: a record’s provenance — source_type, source_id, source_name, field_id, field_type, field_label, field_group_*, submission_id, collected_at. Correcting those means deleting the record and creating it again. The derived enrichment fields (sentiment, sentiment_score, emotions, value_text_translated, translation_lang_key) are not accepted from callers either — they are the Hub’s to compute. metadata is the one field that is replaced, not merged — the Hub assigns it wholesale, so adding a key means sending the existing ones too. Everything else is left untouched when omitted. Ownership is verified before the update, the same way as for get and delete: PATCH /{id} is another Hub endpoint that derives the tenant from the stored record. A record deleted in the window between that check and the write returns the same generic authorization error, not a 502 — nothing was updated and the service is fine. Input:
Output is the updated record.
Editing the text resets what was derived from it. Per the Hub’s contract, changing value_text clears sentiment, sentiment_score, emotions, value_text_translated and translation_lang_key and queues re-enrichment; changing language re-queues the translation pair only. The response reflects the cleared state, so those fields being absent right after an update means “being recomputed”, not “none”. Changing value_text (or a field label) also re-queues the embedding, so semantic search catches up asynchronously — and clearing a record’s text removes its embedding, making it unsearchable.

delete_feedback_record

Permanently deletes one feedback record. Writes data, is not idempotent, is annotated destructiveHint: true, and requires feedbackRecords:write (API keys need manage). The record and its derived embedding are removed with no soft delete, so this cannot be undone — the audit log entry keeps the deleted record as its oldObject and is the only remaining trace. For API keys, the dataset must be assigned to exactly one workspace — the caller’s — because a key’s workspace permission can only identify whose records these are when the dataset is not shared (ENG-2189). A shared dataset returns 403 with an explanation; an integration needing to delete from both workspaces should use a workspace-scoped key per workspace. Session, OAuth and MCP-person principals are unaffected and authorize through their organization role instead. Ownership is verified before the delete: the record must belong to a feedback dataset assigned to the workspace, and a record in another tenant is refused with the same generic authorization error as an unknown id, without deleting anything. Single-record only — there is no bulk delete tool. Input:
Returns 204 No Content on success (the tool result carries only the requestId).

search_feedback_records

Searches a workspace’s feedback dataset semantically: the query is embedded and compared to record embeddings by cosine similarity, so it matches meaning rather than keywords. Read-only and idempotent. Input:
Output is scored matches, best first — record ids with the embedded text, not full records. Pass a feedback_record_id to get_feedback_record for the rest of a record:

find_similar_feedback_records

Finds the records most similar to a given one, by embedding distance — useful for gauging how widely a piece of feedback is echoed. Read-only and idempotent. Same output shape as search_feedback_records; the anchor record is excluded from its own results. Input:
Ownership of the anchor record is verified before any neighbour is fetched (see Feedback Records And The Hub).
Both search tools need embeddings, which are optional in the Hub. Without EMBEDDING_PROVIDER and EMBEDDING_MODEL configured on both the Hub API and the Hub worker they return 503 with that instruction as the detail. Embedding is also asynchronous and only covers records that have text, so a record created moments ago is not searchable yet; find_similar_feedback_records reports that as a 409 rather than an empty result, distinguishing “still being embedded, retry” from “no text, so there is no embedding to wait for” — the latter also covers text cleared by an update.
limit (1–100, default 10) and minScore (0–1, default 0.5) are validated by Formbricks rather than passed straight through: the Hub silently coerces out-of-range values to its own defaults, which would return something other than what was asked for. The default minScore of 0.5 is Formbricks’ own — the Hub defaults to 0.7, which is strict enough that a fair paraphrase often falls just below it.

Relationship to V3 Workflows API

Like the survey tools, workflow tools run no custom database queries — each calls the shared, framework-agnostic @formbricks/workflows handlers used by the v3 REST routes:

Relationship to V3 Surveys API

The MCP server does not run custom survey database queries. Each tool calls the shared server-only v3 survey operations used by the REST routes: When the v3 OpenAPI contract changes, update the MCP schemas and this page together. The v3 spec is hand-authored under docs/api-v3-reference/src/ and bundled to docs/api-v3-reference/openapi.yml. For resources whose schemas are generated (Responses today), the tools’ output schemas follow the contract through pnpm api:v3:sync; their input schemas and this page are still updated by hand. See API v3 Schema Generation.

Feedback Records And The Hub

Feedback-record tools do not map to a v3 REST route. They call the shared server-only Hub service (@/modules/hub/service) — the same client the Unify Feedback UI uses — and enforce the same feedbackDirectories Enterprise entitlement. A feedback record lives in the Formbricks Hub, addressed by an opaque tenant id. Every tool resolves that tenant server-side: it authorizes the caller’s access to workspaceId, checks the feedbackDirectories license, then maps the workspace to its assigned feedback dataset — the FeedbackDirectory id is the Hub tenant id, and it is surfaced to callers as dataset_id. Assignment is a join table, but the application enforces at most one non-archived directory per workspace, so in practice datasetId can be omitted and the single active dataset is used. It becomes required only if a workspace somehow has several active directories, in which case the tools return 400 rather than guessing. A tenant id is never accepted from tool input. Three Hub endpoints — get, delete, and similar — take a bare record id and derive the tenant from the stored record, delegating record-level authorization to the product. So get_feedback_record, delete_feedback_record and find_similar_feedback_records all retrieve the record first and verify its tenant — the named dataset when one was given, otherwise any dataset the workspace owns — before acting. A foreign record and an unknown record produce the same generic authorization error, so record ids cannot be probed across tenants. search_feedback_records instead has the resolved tenant injected into the Hub query, like create_feedback_record.

Limitations

  • OAuth is user-delegated only. Machine-to-machine client credentials for MCP are not supported.
  • OAuth access tokens must be JWTs audience-bound to /api/mcp; opaque MCP access token introspection is not accepted by the MCP route.
  • API-key authentication remains supported for compatibility and fallback use.
  • The MCP server exposes only the survey, workflow, response and feedback-record operations listed on this page.
  • Survey and workflow tool coverage depends on the current v3 Surveys and Workflows REST endpoint coverage; feedback-record tool coverage depends on the Hub feedback-records API.
  • enable_workflow makes a workflow live and can trigger email sending; treat it as a high-impact mutation when granting agents write access.
  • create_workflow requires a complete workflow definition (schema version, trigger, entry node); it is created as a draft and only enable_workflow can make it live.
  • Feedback-record tools require the feedbackDirectories Enterprise entitlement and a feedback directory assigned to the workspace; without either they return 403 / 422.
  • A feedback record’s provenance is immutable: update_feedback_record changes values, users, language and metadata, but not which source, question or submission a record belongs to, nor when it was collected. The derived enrichment fields are the Hub’s to compute and are never accepted from callers.
  • delete_feedback_record deletes one record at a time. The Hub’s bulk and delete-by-user endpoints are deliberately not exposed: they are erasure operations whose blast radius does not belong on an agent surface. There is deliberately no batch delete to match create_feedback_records.
  • Counting and filtering cover the Hub’s own filter set only. There is no aggregation by sentiment or emotion, and semantic search cannot be narrowed by source or date — the Hub’s search endpoint takes only a query and a tenant. Those need Hub-side support first.
  • The search tools require an embedding model configured on the Hub API and the Hub worker; without one they return 503. Embedding is asynchronous and covers only records with text.
  • outputSchema is declared on the response tools only. The survey, workflow and feedback-record tools still advertise no result shape, so a client has to infer theirs from an example.
  • The response tools cover the v3 operations and nothing more: there is no tool that adds or removes a single tag, because PATCH replaces the tag set wholesale and such a tool would be a read-modify-write wrapper with its own race rather than an operation.
  • create_survey creates link surveys only. In-app survey creation and distribution settings are not part of the current v3 create operation.
  • edit_survey_blocks and set_survey_block_order operate on whole blocks. There is no element-level operation: elements travel inside the block payload, and going finer would reintroduce the same resend problem one level down.
  • Ordering is validated as a delta on the patch family only: a change may not introduce a #recall: that points forwards, a logic condition reading a later block, or a requireAnswer targeting an earlier one (misordered_reference). Violations a survey already contains are left alone, so an existing survey never becomes unpatchable — enforcing the full set would repeat the ENG-3070 failure. create_survey is deliberately not covered: tightening it would reject payloads that are valid today, which needs its own versioned rollout.
  • stored_survey_invalid (422) means the stored survey cannot be read as a v3 document (legacy questions, no v3 block list, a shape that does not parse); the reported paths are into the survey, not the request — repair it in the editor. A survey that reads fine but already fails validation stays patchable: issues it already had are not refused, only issues a patch newly introduces (ENG-3975). Publishing a draft is the exception — it is refused as stored_survey_invalid until the survey passes.
  • patch_survey follows the v3 PATCH contract: top-level partial document updates only, no JSON Patch, and no nested deep merge. Provided top-level objects and arrays replace their whole subtree and can remove omitted nested entries.
  • validate_survey validates payload shape and references; it does not create languages, survey versions, or surveys.
  • Query-string credentials are rejected; use headers for API keys.
  • Large request bodies are rejected before the MCP handler using the same body-size policy as v3 APIs.
  • Tool arguments are strict: undeclared keys are rejected rather than ignored (see Tool Arguments).
  • Resources and prompts are not exposed — the server registers tools only, so there is no MCP resource for the survey document contract yet.
  • subscriptions/listen is refused (maxSubscriptions: 0). The 2026-07-28 revision replaced the GET SSE endpoint with a long-lived POST-response stream, but with no resources registered and no list-changed notifications emitted, such a stream could never deliver anything — it would just hold a connection. A client that opens one gets Subscription limit reached; the list endpoints remain the way to see current tools, prompts and resources.

Implementation Files

  • apps/web/app/api/mcp/route.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/auth.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/server.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/surveys.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/workspaces.ts (workspace discovery and the workspace custom CSS tools)
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/feedback-records.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/schemas.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/workflows.ts
  • apps/web/modules/mcp/tools/workflow-schemas.ts
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/surveys/lib/operations.ts
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/workspaces/lib/custom-css.ts (workspace custom CSS operations)
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/surveys/blocks.ts (pure block op-application and reorder logic)
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/workflows/lib/context.ts (adapter to the @formbricks/workflows handlers)
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/feedbackRecords/lib/operations.ts
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/feedbackRecords/lib/access.ts (tenant resolution + per-record ownership guard)
  • apps/web/app/api/v3/feedbackRecords/lib/errors.ts (Hub error → v3 problem mapping)